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analysis, the non-quantifiable factors of Navy fleet
oiler force level requirements, the expected recruiting
environment in the 1980 's, and the requirement for a
training platform for the multi-product AOE/AOR replenish-
ment station ships were presented and discussed. Conclu-
sions were drawn based upon the cost and non-quantifiable
factor analysis and recommendations concerning the manning
of the AO-177 class fleet oilers, future fleet oiler manning,
and possible further research were presented.
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This study develops comparative life cycle costs for the
Navy military and Navy military-conversion to civil service
manning options for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. These
life cycle costs were derived by discounting the total
annual cost elements of personnel, operations, and mainte-
nance over thirty years using mid-year discount factors
corresponding to a ten percent discount rate. In addition
to the life cycle cost analysis, the non-quantifiable
factors of Navy fleet oiler force level requirements, the
expected recruiting environment in the 1980 's, and the
requirement for a training platform for the multi-product
AOE/AOR replenishment station ships were presented and
discussed. Conclusions were drawn based upon the cost and
non-quantifiable factor analysis and recommendations con-
cerning the manning of the AO-177 class fleet oilers, future
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In 1978, commenting on a 1978 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report on fleet oilers (AO's), the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) stated that the Navy was converting all
fleet oilers to civilian manning and that all future AO's
would be built for civilian crews. Since 1972 the Navy has
been converting some of the older AO's to Military Sealift
Command (MSC) Navy civil service manning for extended service
as part of the Navy Mobile Logistics Support Forces (MLSF)
.
The FY 75 ship construction plan provided for the construc-
tion of five ships of a newly designed AO-177 class fleet
oiler which was to be an austere, minimum-manned oiler with
a 120,000 barrel cargo capacity. These five ships have been
built for military manning. In May 1980 the Naval Audit
Service recommended that the AO-177 class fleet oilers be
converted to civilian manning at their first scheduled over-
haul [Ref. 1]. Faced with this recommendation from within,
the Navy must decide if it can realize significant annual
budget and life cycle cost savings by such a conversion while




B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Any decision concerning the manning options of the
AO-177 class fleet oiler will be greatly influenced by the
quantifiable cost comparison of the manning options con-
sidered. The problem then is to determine what level of
MSC naval civil service or Navy military manning is required
for the AO-177 class fleet oiler to fulfill the required
operational capabilities of that class ship. Given those
manning levels, the question is whether significant life
cycle cost savings can be realized if the ship were to be
converted from Navy military to MSC civil service manning.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE ANALYSIS
The objective of this analysis will be to develop
comparable life cycle costs associated with the military
and civil service manning options for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler to determine if significant cost savings can be real-
ized by conversion of the AO-177 class fleet oiler to civil
service manning. The civilian contract manning option will
not be analyzed as the Navy has revealed substantial concern
about contract manning of its ships. On 5 March 1981 a naval
representative appearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee was asked if either MSC or the Navy had experi-
enced problems with "the contractor operations for the tanker
ships which would not have occurred if the ships were manned
by civil service personnel." The naval representative stated
11

that MSC had experienced problems, saying that "in every
instance where a contract has been let to a new operator
with different union affiliations than that of a previous
operator, the unions affiliated with the previous operator
have attempted unsuccessfully to upset the procurement action
and on occasion, to disrupt the operation of the tankers"
[Ref . 2] . It is because of these difficulties which MSC has
experienced that the Navy is reluctant to man its fleet
support ships with civilian contract personnel.
D. CONTENTS
The following chapter of this thesis will briefly discuss
two pertinent studies which deal with civilian manning of
Navy ships. The Investigation of the Potential for Increased
Use of Civilian Manning in Fleet Support Ships
,
(CIVMAN) , and
the Analysis of a Study Entitled Civilianization of Navy
Fleet Support Ships Prepared for the Joint Maritime Congress
,
(CIV 77) . Both studies were performed by Information
Spectrum, Inc. Chapter III will state the projected opera-
tional environment (POE) and briefly discuss the required
operational capabilities (ROC's) of the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. Given these required capabilities, the Navy and civil
service manning levels necessary to meet these requirements
will be stated. Chapter IV will develop annual personnel
costs for each manning option, and then total annual costs
will be developed to include personnel, operations, and
12

maintenance costs. The cost of reconfiguration for civilian
manning will apply to the civil service manning option only.
The annual costs developed will then be discounted over
thirty years to determine life cycle costs for each manning
option. Appendix A complements Chapter IV in that it shows
the detailed derivation of the Navy and military detachment
billet costs. In Chapter V sensitivity analysis will be
performed on those cost factors developed in Chapter IV
which are most volatile. In addition other non-quantifiable
factors which would weigh heavily in any manning decision
will be examined in Chapter V. These factors are Navy fleet
oiler force-level requirements to support carrier battle
groups, the expected recruiting environment during this
decade, and the requirement for a Navy-operated AO-177 to
serve as a training platform for the multi-product AOE/AOR
ships. Chapter VI will summarize this thesis and present





The CIVMAN study, formally titled The Investigation of
the Potential for Increased Use of Civilian Manning in Fleet
Support Ships
,
was prepared for the Department of the Navy
by Information Spectrum, Inc. and was released on July 17,
1978. The method of analysis used in this study was to
evaluate the Navy civil service and the commercial contract
manning alternatives to Navy military manning of fleet
support ships with respect to manpower requirements, manpower
costs, total ship operating costs, mission fulfillment capa-
bility, operating policy, risks, and total fleet and merchant
marine labor market effects. Each manning alternative was
evaluated in terms of those parameters to derive comparative
information between current manning and operating policies
and possible alternative future manning and operating policies
for Navy fleet support ships. The CIVMAN analysis was done
at a time of significant fiscal constraints and potential
military manpower shortfalls and was one of several initia-
tives by the CNO which attempted to "redress the supply/demand
problem in the context of total force manpower management"
[Ref. 3: p. 1]. While it did not reach any conclusions, it
did analyze the implications of the three manning alterna-
tives both quantitatively and qualitatively and was therefore
14

considered the baseline for examining the increased use o£
civilian manning in the fleet.
B. CIV 77
In March 1980 the Joint Maritime Congress (JMC) released
a report, in draft form only, formally titled "Civilianization
of Navy Fleet Support Ships," which took issue with the find-
ings of the CIVMAN study. At the request of the Department
of the Navy, Information Spectrum then did a study formally
titled Analysis of a Study Entitled Civilianization of Navy
Fleet Support Ships Prepared for the Joint Maritime Congress
,
(CIV 77), which it published on December 15, 1980. The
CIV 77 study found the JMC report wanting in its failure to
consider the specific areas of ship mission, role, and manning
philosophy when doing cost comparisons of manning alterna-
tives for the ships concerned. The CIV 77 study also updated
the CIVMAN report in that it estimated operating costs for
the three manning options (Navy military, Navy civil service,
and civilian contract) using reconstructed and updated manning




A. REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
OPNAVINST 3501.134 dated April 21, 1980 [Re£. 5] promul-
gates the projected operational environment (POE) and
required operational capabilities (ROC's) for the AO-177
class fleet oiler. The POE was established to develop
organizational manpower requirements in the Preliminary
Ships Manning Document (PSMD) for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler [Ref. 4]. An at-sea, wartime environment is detailed
where the capability to perform all defensive functions
simultaneously while in Readiness Condition I, or to other-
wise maintain continuous Readiness Condition III is necessary
Readiness Condition I is defined as all personnel being con-
tinuously alert, all possible operational systems being
manned and operating, and no maintenance is expected except
that which is routinely associated with watchstanding and
urgent repairs . The maximum expected crew endurance at
Condition I is twenty-four continuous hours. Readiness
Condition III is defined as operational systems being manned
and operating as necessary to conform to prescribed required
operational capabilities, including accomplishment of all
normal underway maintenance, support, and administrative
functions. Opportunity for eight hours of rest per man per
day exists in Readiness Condition III; the maximum expected
16

crew endurance in this condition is sixty continuous days
[Ref. 4: p. 4]. The need to otherwise be able to conduct
underway replenishment in support of operating forces by
simultaneously providing petroleum product or other product
support from five replenishment stations (for periods not
to exceed thirty-two hours per week) is established as well
as the need to be able to conduct vertical replenishment of
operating forces. Additionally, the crew must be able to
perform all maintenance for which it is responsible.
The required operational capabilities for the AO-177
class fleet oiler are defined by mission areas. These mission
areas are Mobility, Command and Control and Communications,
Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Logistics, Fleet
Support Operations, Non-Combat Operations, and Intelligence
[Ref. 5: End. 1, 2]. The ROC's will not be enumerated in
this analysis; however, individual ROC's will be referenced
in the determination of manpower requirements for the two
manning options being considered.
Effectiveness will be fixed in this analysis by the ROC's
of the AO-177 class fleet oiler. Once the Navy and civil
service manning levels required to fulfill the ROC's are





1. Navy Military Manning
The Navy military manning analysis is based on the
organizational requirements developed by the Preliminary
Ships Manning Document (PSMD) for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler, dated 18 January 1980 [Ref. 4]. It will be assumed
that the AO-177 will be manned to the PSMD level, although
most naval ships are manned to a level lower than this.
2
.
Navy Civil Service Manning
The initial manpower requirement estimates for Navy
civil service manning were obtained from the CIVMAN study.
Information Spectrum, Inc. used Military Sealift Command
manning estimates based on the MSC analysis of tasks required
to ensure mission performance and ship maintenance in a peace-
time environment. These estimates include both the civil
service personnel and military detachments (Mildet) required
for ship operation. These military detachments carry out
those functions deemed inappropriate for accomplishment by
civil service personnel. For the purposes of this analysis
the MSC estimates will be adjusted to meet manpower require-
ments to fulfill all ROC'S of the AO-177 class fleet oiler.
C. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS .ANALYSIS
1 . Navy Military Manning to PSMD
The PSMD delineates, by individual billets, total
manpower requirements essential to the performance of assigned
18

mission areas and required operational capabilities prescribed
for a fully ready unit. These manpower requirements are
predicated upon the mission, operating profile, configuration,
and computed workload for a Navy manned AO-177 class fleet
oiler. The Manpower Summary for the Navy military manned
AO-177 class fleet oiler, as contained in the PSMD, is shown
in Table I. Appendix A shows the grade, rate, and rating
breakdown of each department.
2 . Navy Civil Service Manning
As previously stated, the Military Sealift Command
manpower estimates were used in this analysis to determine
manpower costs. For the purposes of this analysis the only
adjustment made to the MSC manpower estimate was the addition
of seven Operations Specialists to the military detachment
so that the Command and Control and Communications, Anti-Air
Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, and Intelligence mission area
capabilities of the Navy manned and civil service manned
AO-177 class fleet oiler would be equal. Based upon bridge
watchstander , replenishment station, and cargo control man-
power requirements, it has been determined through informal
conversations with personnel in OPNAV 575 that the civil
service manned AO-177 class fleet oiler is capable of per-
forming all required operational capabilities given the civil
service manning level proposed by MSC. The civil service




















































* Licensed personnel are the ship's officers that have been
examined and licensed by the United States Coast Guard.
Unlicensed personnel have demonstrated practical skills to
Coast Guard observers and have been issued a card author-
izing them to serve in particular capacities aboard ship.
** Denotes Mildet.
(1) Added to initial MSC estimate for this analysis.
[Ref. 3: p. A-8]
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IV. BASELINE COST ANALYSIS
The life cycle costs for the Navy military and civil
service manning options for the AO-177 class fleet oiler
will be derived in three stages using FY 81 dollars as the
base for all cost computations. FY 81 dollars have been
utilized because the latest Navy Billet Cost Model available
for this study was computed using the FY 81 pay rates for
naval personnel. Initially, annual personnel costs will be
computed for each manning option. These annual personnel
costs will then be combined with operations and maintenance
costs for each manning option to derive total annual costs.
In the case of the Navy military manning option, the total
annual costs will be discounted over thirty years to derive
life cycle costs. In the case of the civil service manning
option, it will be assumed that conversion to civil service
operation will take place after four years operation as a
naval vessel. It will also be assumed that the conversion
will take one year to complete. This assumption is based
upon a reconfiguration estimate of 12-15 months made by
OP-375D personnel in 1980 [Ref. 13], During this year only
the costs of reconfiguration will be included in the life




Given the assumptions discussed in the previous para-
graph, the total annual costs o£ Navy military operation
will be discounted over the initial four years of the oiler's
life and then added to the total annual costs derived for
the civil service manning option discounted over twenty-
five years. To these figures will be added the discounted
cost of reconfiguration to derive the total Navy military-
conversion to civil service manning life cycle costs. All
discounted costs will be derived using mid-year factors
corresponding to a discount rate of ten percent.
The life cycle cost computations which will be
illustrated in this chapter, while detailed, can only be
considered approximate, partly due to the inherent weaknesses
of the costing data sources. The primary sources of the base
line costing data are the 1979 Navy Program Factors Manual,
the FY 81 Navy Billet Cost Model and the CIVMAN and CIV 77
studies. The 1979 Navy Program Factors Manual is presently
almost three years old and is currently under revision at
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-90). The
FY 81 Navy Billet Cost Model is currently under revision
at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center.
Informal conversations with a representative of that organi-
zation indicate that the model is being updated to reflect
the substantial military pay increase of FY 82 and other
inadequacies which tended to understate billet costs
22

associated with Navy personnel. As these two documents were
the primary sources for the Navy military personnel, opera-
tions, and maintenance costs for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler, it must be recognized that the life cycle costs of
the Navy military manning option may be somewhat understated.
The same can be said of the Navy military-conversion to
civil service manning option life cycle costs to be derived
in this study. The Navy civil service personnel costs will
be derived primarily by using personnel cost category data
from the CIVMAN study. Informal conversations with a
representative of the Military Sealift Command comptroller's
office indicate that the MSC cost category data furnished to
Information Spectrum for the CIVMAN study was based upon a
specified MSC AO-177 class fleet oiler operating profile
equal to that of a Navy-operated oiler of that class.
Actual operating profiles of MSC civil service manned oilers,
however, have been higher than Navy military manned oilers
indicating that the civil service personnel costs included
in the CIVMAN study may be understated.
A life cycle cost comparison is a necessary part of any
manning option decision concerning the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. A detailed baseline cost of both manning option life
cycle costs will therefore be derived in this chapter. The
inherent weaknesses of the baseline costing data is recognized,
however, and therefore not only will life cycle cost sensitiv-
ity to varying cost elements be conducted in Chapter V, but
23

also non-quantifiable factors which would weigh heavily in
any manning decision for the AO-177 class fleet oiler will
be examined in that chapter.
A. ANNUAL PERSONNEL COSTS
1. Navy Military Manning to PSMD
The annual military personnel cost represents the
annual cost associated with manning the AO-177 class fleet
oiler to the PSMD level in the Navy military manning option,
This cost includes both those billet costs of manning parti-
cular positions with given ratings and paygrades, and the
other indirect personnel costs of base operations support
(BOS), and logistics support. For this analysis the FY 81
Life Cycle Billet Costs for both officer and enlisted
personnel were used to derive the annual total billet costs
of manning the AO-177 class fleet oiler to PSMD level. The
cost elements included in the Navy Billet Cost Model for
both officer and enlisted personnel are shown in Figure 4.1.
The indirect costs of base operations support and logistics
support for the AO-177 class fleet oiler were obtained from
the 1979 Navy Program Factors Manual in FY 31 dollars.
To derive the annual Navy military personnel costs
the billet costs by grade and rating were applied to the
number of personnel of each grade and rating found in the
PSMD for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. The indirect costs
of base operations support and logistics support were added
24




























































Figure 4.1 Elements of the Navy Billet Cost Model
to the Navy billet costs to derive the total annual personnel
costs to man the AO-177 class fleet oiler to PSMD level.
Appendix A shows the detailed derivation of the Navy billet
costs for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. The total annual
personnel costs associated with Navy military manning are




Navy Military Manning Personnel Cost Summary
Cost Category Annual Cost
Navy Billet Cost 5,685,572
Logistic Support 1,106,000
Base Operations Support 106,000
TOTAL NAVY PERSONNEL COST 4,897,572
2. Navy Civil Service Manning
The funding categories included in the civil service
personnel cost estimates are shown in Figure 4.2. The base
pay cost was computed using the Atlantic Coast wage rates
for MSC mariners effective 16 June 1981. These wage rates
reflect the maritime union wages paid to MSC civil service
mariners serving aboard MSC ships. To derive the MSC base
pay cost, the manning levels were applied to the correspond-
ing wage scale to find the total cost of each billet. These
billet costs were then summed to find the base pay total.
Except where otherwise noted, the other cost categories are
based on a percentage of base pay. The Navy civil service
manning level and associated base pay is shown in Table IV.
Overtime, Premium/Penalty Pay, Travel, and Other
cost categories are dependent on the operating profile of the
ship. As no operational data for the AO-177 class fleet




Overtime Pay Damage Control Instruction
Premium/Penalty Pay Annual Sick and Military Leave
Subsistence Insurance (Medical and Life)
Retirement Shore Leave
Other (Relief Officers, Workman's Compensation
awaiting assignment) Training
[Ref. 8, Vol. Ill: p. A-101]
Figure 4.2 Civil Service Personnel Cost Structure
original FY 77 dollar MSC category costs to base pay ratio
has been used to compute these categories as a percentage of
base pay. The FY 77 dollar costs used were those found in
the CIVMAN and CIV 77 studies which for cost comparison
purposes used the same operating profile for both Navy and
MSC-operated AO-177 class fleet oilers. This percentage was
then applied to the FY 81 dollar base pay figure to derive
FY 81 dollar cost estimates. All other cost categories were
derived based on either OMB Circular A-76 rates or rates
provided by the Military Sealift Command Comptroller's Office
The military detachment billet cost was derived in
the same manner as the Navy billet cost was for the Navy
military manning option except that only those billets
included in the military detachment were used. Appendix A
shows this derivation in detail. The indirect cost of
logistics support for the military detachment was derived






















































1 43 ,910 43,,910
1 30 ,335 30 ,335
2 26 ,364 52,,728
2 19;,980 39 ,960
1 18 ,443 18 ,443
5 16 ,994 84,,970
6 14 ,425 86 ,550
14 16 ,396 229 ,544
3 11 ,432 34 ,296
1 50 ,626 50 626
1 69 ,528 69 ,528
1 43 ,910 43 ,910
2 38 ,829 77 ,658
1 33 ,748 33 ,748
3 18 ,024 54 ,072
3 20 ,166 60 ,498
1 20 ,608 20 ,608
2 18,,473 36 ,946
1 22 ,053 22,,053
1 2o;,608 20 ,608
3 13.,242 39,,726
3 26 ,364 79 ,092
1 20 ,060 20 ,060
1 17,,330 17 ,530
1 15 ,005 15 ,005
2 11,,946 23 ,892
1 IS ,005 15 ,005
5 11 ,052 55 ,260
9 11 ,052 99 468
2 11 ,654 23 ,308
1 31 ,047 31, 047
1 24 ,400 24 ,400
4 16 297 65 ,188
1 27 ,298 27,,298




levels to the logistics support figure used in the Navy
military manning option. Base operations support costs are
assumed to remain constant for both manning options as these
costs will be incurred regardless of the manning option
chosen. This is because base operations support costs vary
according to the number and types of ships which operate
out of U.S. naval bases. As the manning option chosen does
not affect this criterion a constant BOS cost for each manning
option is justified. Table V represents the total Navy
civil service personnel costs.
B. TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS
The total annual cost of each manning option includes
the personnel costs already derived in this analysis as well
as other costs incurred such as operation, maintenance, and
berthing and support of the ship. Whereas in the Navy mili-
tary manning option, the Navy billet, logistics support, and
base operations support costs are categorized as personnel
costs , the same is not true in the case of the civil service
option. Not only are the more obvious costs of fuel, utili-
ties, repair parts, stores and supplies, and other costs
categorized as operations costs, but so are the not-so-
obvious costs of civil service personnel, and military detach-
ment logistics and base operations support costs. The reason
for this is because MSC is reimbursed for its services by the




Navy Civil Service Personnel Costs
Cost Category Cost
Total Base Pay 1,746,784
Overtime (.59 Base Pay) (1) 1,030,603
Premium/Penalty Pay (.06 Base Pay ) (1) 104,807
Subsistence ($5.50 per man per day) (2) 178,668
Other (.0597 Base Pay ) (1) 104,283
Retirement (.204 Base Pay) (3) 356,344
Life ^ Health Insurance (.037 Base Pay) (2) 64,631
Workman's Compensation (.019 Base Pay) (2) 33,189
Shore Leave (.105 Base Pay) (2) 183,412
Annual Sick § ^Military Leave (.245 Base Pay) (2) 427,962
Travel (.002 Base Pay ) (2) 3,494
TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL COST 4,2 34,177
Mildet Billet Cost 493,930
Mildet Logsitic SupDort 145,232
Mildet BOS ' 106,000
TOTAL PERSONNEL COST 4,979,339
(1) No data exists; original MSC estimate used as a
percentage of Base Pay.
(2) Furnished by MSC comptroller's office.
(3) Based on OMB Circular A-76.
[Ref. 9]
comprised of restricted availability (R.W) , intermediate
maintenance activity (IMA) , and overhaul in the case of the
Navy military manning option. All civil service maintenance
costs, including overhaul, are included in the "civil service
maintenance" cost category. The total cost breakdown shown

in Figure 4.3 will be used to illustrate total annual costs
The following paragraphs describe the methodology used to
estimate the total annual costs of each manning option.
PERSONNEL
Navy Billet Cost/Mildet Billet Cost
Logistics Support












Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA)
Overhaul
Civil Service Maintenance (Includes Overhaul)
MSC OVERHEAD
* These costs reflect the personnel costs of the Mildet
assigned to MSC ships. These costs, plus the civil
service personnel costs (in the case of the civil
service option) , are categorized as operations costs
because MSC is reimbursed by the Navy through the Navy
Industrial Fund. MSC bills the Navy for its services.
[Ref. 8, Vol. II: p. IV-19]
Figure 4.5 Total Annual Cost Structure
1 . Navy Military Manning
The annual personnel costs associated with the Navy
military manning option have been computed previously in
this analysis. All of the indirect personnel costs and
31

operations and maintenance costs for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler were obtained from the October 1979 Navy Program
Factors Manual for FY 81 dollars. It should be noted that
the Navy Program Factors Manual assumes a four year overhaul
cycle with RAV's and IMA work scheduled at regular, frequent
intervals between overhauls. Table VI gives the total
annual cost breakdown for the Navy military manning option.
TABLE VI
Navy Military Manning Alternative Total Annual Costs
Cost Category Cost
PERSONNEL
Navy Billet Cost 3,685,572
Logistics Support 1,106,000









Annual Overhaul 3 ,934 ,000
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY MANNING ANNUAL COSTS 12,268,572
Note: Unit overhaul costs are 18,030,000 at four




2 . Navy Civil Service Manning
The total annual personnel costs to man a ship with
Navy civil service mariners and the associated military
detachment have been computed previously in this analysis.
The personnel costs resulting from the civil service crew,
as well as the indirect cost associated with the military
detachment, are categorized as operations costs because MSC
is reimbursed for its services by the Navy through the Navy
Industrial Fund. The indirect operations cost of logistics
support has been reduced proportionally by the ratio of the
military detachment to the total PSMD manning level. As
stated previously, base operations support costs are assumed
to remain constant for both manning options as these costs
will be incurred on naval bases regardless of the manning
option chosen for the AO-177 class fleet oiler.
The operations costs of fuel and utilities have been
assumed to be equal to those of the Navy military manning
option. This was because no current data exists at Military
Sealift Command concerning these estimates. The FY 77 dollar
estimate made by MSC for the CIVMAN study included aggregated
figures for "MSC OPERATIONS (Annual)" and "MSC MAINTENAiNCE
(Annual)." The operations figure included costs of fuel,
and stores and supplies but did not enumerate these costs.
As stated previously, it was therefore necessary to assume
that the fuel cost of the civil service manning option
^j

equals that of the Navy military manning option. Therefore,
by subtracting the Navy fuel cost derived for the CIVMAN
study from the "MSC OPERATIONS" figure, one derives the cost
of stores and supplies for the civil service manning option.
"MSC MAINTENANCE" costs vary from year to year
primarily due to the MSC policy of overhauling ships bienni-
ally. MSC also performs 30-45 day mid-period inspections
between overhaul years at which time other repair work is
performed. These actions result in a six year period of
varying maintenance costs. Therefore, in order to compen-
sate for yearly differences in maintenance costs, these costs
were annualized for annual cost purposes by dividing the
total projected maintenance costs for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler by the length of the overhaul cycle, six years.
The "MSC OPER.\TIONS" and "MSC MAINTENMCE" costs
were converted to FY 81 dollars by use of the DoD Operations
and Maintenance economic index conversion factor of 1.45 for
FY 77 to FY 81. This factor was provided by the Department
of Defense Comptroller's Office. The total annual budget
cost breakdown for the Navy civil service manning option is
shown in Table VII.
3. Total Annual Cost Comparison
The total annual costs for each manning option were
derived primarily from the Navy Program Factors Manual, the




Navy Civil Service Manning Total Annual Costs
Cost Category Cost
OPERATIONS
Civil Service Personnel 4,234,177
Fuel 1,578,000
Utilities 368,000
Stores and Supplies 281,710
Mildet Logistics Support 145,232
Mildet BOS 106,000
MAINTENANCE
Ship's Maintenance (Includes Overhaul) 1 ,454 ,310
OPERATIONS/MAINTENAiNCE SUBTOTAL 8,167,429
MSC OVERHEAD (.05 Surcharge) 408,371
PERSONNEL
Mildet Billet 493,930
TOTAL NAVY CIVIL SERVICE MANNING ANNUAL COSTS 9,069,7 30
Note: The reconfiguration costs to convert the
AO-177 class fleet oiler to civilian manning
was estimated at $22 million in FY 81.
separated into the three cost categories of personnel,
operations, and maintenance. Whereas the summed annual
personnel and operations costs of both manning options are
nearly equal, the annual Navy maintenance costs are much
greater than those of MSC. There are two plausible reasons
for this disparity; either the MSC maintenance costs, which
were derived from CIVMAN, are underestimated, or the Navy
maintenance policy is considerably different than that of
MSC, A comparison of the two maintenance policies reveals
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some significant differences. The Navy schedules restricted
availabilities and intermediate maintenance on a regular,
frequent basis between major overhauls. MSC schedules over-
hauls every two years with mid-year inspection/repair in
between. iVhile it is not the intent of this study to delve
any deeper into the overhaul policies of either organization,
this is an area of considerable interest and should be the
subject of further research. A possible reason for a more
costly Navy maintenance policy could be that the Navy expects
to operate a ship well beyond thirty years, as evidenced by
the number of operational Navy and Navy-conversion to MSC
oilers presently over thirty years of age.
For the purposes of this study a thirty year life
has been assumed for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. Given
this limiting assumption, it might also be assumed that a
different overhaul policy could be adopted that would
still be adequate to maintain the AO-177 for thirty years.
Assuming that MSC's maintenance policy meets this criterion,
then it is reasonable to question what the Navy military
and Navy military-conversion to civil service life cycle
costs would be if the Navy were to adopt the MSC maintenance
policy for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. The sensitivity
of life cycle costs to this change in maintenance policy
will be examined for both alternatives in the next chapter.
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C. TOTAL LIFE CYCLE COSTS (DISCOUNTED)
To derive comparative life cycle costs for each manning
option, the cost elements considered in the total annual
cost breakdown have been discounted over a thirty year
period using ten percent mid-year discount factors. The
total cost structure used in Figure 4.3 will be used to
illustrate the life cycle costs.
1. Navy Military Manning Life Cycle Costs
For the purposes of this analysis a thirty year life
has been assumed for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. As
previously stated, the annual costs of personnel in the Navy
military manning option were estimated using the Navy Billet
Cost Model for FY 81. The indirect cost categories of
logistics support and base operations support are not
included in the model and have therefore been included in
the life cycle cost analysis. These annual costs were then
discounted over a thirty year period to derive the life
cycle personnel costs.
To determine the life cycle cost of operations and
maintenance, the annual cost categories derived earlier in
this study have been discounted over a thirty year period.
Reconfiguration costs for the Navy military manning option
are considered to be zero. The Navy military manning option




Navy Military Manning Life Cycle Costs
Cost Category Annual 30 Year Discounted
Cost L:L£e Cycle Cost
PERSONNEL
Navy Billet Cost 3,685,572 38,219,382










Annual Overhaul 3,934,000 40,795,580
RECONFIGURATION
TOTAL NAVY MILITARY M\NNING
LIFE CYCLE COST 126,312,532
[Refs. 6, 7, 10]
2. Navy Civil Service Manning Life Cycle Costs
In deriving the thirty year life cycle costs associ-
ated with the civil service manning option for the AO-177
class fleet oiler some initial assumptions must be made.
Navy representatives estimated that in FY 81 it would cost a
minimum of twenty-two million dollars to convert the AO-177
to civilian manning [Ref . 1] . It will be assumed that the
first overhaul on the AO-177 fleet oiler will be in FY 85
after four years operation as a Navy manned vessel, and that

conversion to civilian manning will take place at that time.
It will also be assumed that the reconfiguration will take
twelve months. Given these assumptions, the Navy military
operations, maintenance (including overhaul), and personnel
annual costs will be discounted over four years, to account
for the economic costs of operating the ship as a military
vessel for four years. For the next year, during which the
overhaul and reconfiguration take place, only the cost of
reconfiguration will be included in the life cycle costing
analysis. This is because it will be assumed that the
Mildet and civil service creiv will be assigned after comple-
tion of the overhaul/reconfiguration, and that all remaining
operations and maintenance costs for the overhaul/reconfigu-
ration period will be zero. It must be remembered that the
cost of overhaul has already been included by discounting
the Navy annual overhaul costs over four years. The dis-
counted reconfiguration figure will be derived by taking
the net present value of the FY 81 reconfiguration estimate
in FY 85. For the remaining twenty-five years of civil
service operation, the annual cost categories of operations
and maintenance which were derived for the civil service
option annual costs were discounted at ten percent over
twenty-five years. The annual military detachment costs
were computed by applying the billet cost by rate and
paygrade to the number of Navy personnel in the military
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detachment. These costs were then discounted using the same
method described for the civil service operation and mainte-
nance costs. The civil service operation and maintenance,
and Navy military detachment costs were then added to the
discounted costs of operating the ship with a Navy crew for
four years. The Navy military-conversion to civil service
manning life cycle costs are shown in Table IX.
D. CUMULATIVE COST ANALYSIS
To determine comparative life cycle costs for each
manning option, the total annual costs were discounted over
thirty years using mid-year discount factors corresponding
to a ten percent discount rate. Cumulative costs of each
manning option will now be derived so that they, too, can be
compared. These cumulative, undiscounted costs for each
manning option will be shown graphically on a time versus
cumulative cost graph as illustrated in Figure 4.4.
In deriving the cumulative cost line for the Navy mili-
tary manning option, the total annual costs were simply
multiplied by the thirty year life of the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. The cumulative cost line resulting is shown connect-
ing the origin and the total cumulative cost of the Navy
military manning option over a thirty year period.
To derive the cumulative cost line for the civil service
manning option, the same method was applied except the cost




Navy Military - Conversion to Civil Service Life Cycle Costs
NAVY MILITARY COSTS (4 YEARS)




Navy Billet Cost 3,685,572 12,851,590













TOTAL 4 YEAR NAVY DISCOUNTED 42,472,398
CIVIL SERVICE COSTS (25 YEARS)




Mildet Billet Cost 493,930 3,215,593
OPERATIONS
Civil Service Personnel 4,234,177 27,565,424
Fuel 1,578,000 10,273,127
Utilities 368,000 2,395,761
Stores ^ Supplies 281,000 1,829,372
Mildet Logistics Support 139,646 909,126







MSC OVERHEAD (.05 Surcharge) 408,648 2,660,588
RECONFIGURATION 15,744,000
TOTAL DISCOUNTED CIVIL SERVICE LIFE
CYCLE COSTS 74,750,753
TOTAL DISCOUNTED NAVY COSTS 42,472,398
TOTAL NAVY - CIVIL SERVICE LIFE
CYCLE COSTS 117,223,151
Note: The reconfiguration figure represents the net
present value of the FY 81 reconfiguration
estimate of $22 million in FY 85.
[Refs. 6, 7, 10]
initial four years of this option the line would be the same
as that for the Navy military manning option. The reconfigu-
ration and associated zero operating and maintenance costs
are shown by the spike and horizontal section of the line.
Then, to derive the cumulative cost of the civil service
option, the total annual costs of the civil service option
were multiplied by twenty-five and added to the cumulative costs
of the initial five years (four years Navy operation and one
year reconfiguration) of the oiler's life.
It can be seen that the slope of each line is the total
annual cost associated with the manning option it represents.
As the total annual costs for the civil service manning are










, 000 , 000
298 , 000 ,000














( v e a r 3 )
Civil Service
Cumulative Costs
Figure 4.4 Cumulative Cost Graph
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cost lines cross. This is significant in that it implies
that with a sufficiently large discount rate, the life cycle
costs of the Navy military manning option would be less than
those of the civil service manning option due to the relative
weight that discounting places on early year costs in life
cycle costing. It has already been determined that the civil
service manning option has the smaller life cycle costs at
a ten percent discount rate. The sensitivity of life cycle
costs to differing discount rates will be examined in the
next chapter to determine at what discount rate the relative
life cycle costs of the manning options reverse.
E. BASELINE COST ANALYSIS SUMMARY
In this chapter thirty year life cycle costs have been
developed for both the Navy military and Navy-conversion to
civil service manning options for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. FY 81 dollars were used as the base to determine
annual personnel and total annual costs for each manning
option. In that total annual costs drive life cycle costs
to a considerable degree, the manning option total annual
costs were then analyzed to determine what manning option
cost elements were significantly different. The maintenance
cost element in the civil service option was found to be
considerably less than that for the Navy military option.
The possible reasons for this were discussed and then the
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question was posed of what effect an MSC maintenance policy
would have on Navy life cycle costs.
Life cycle costs for each manning option were derived by
discounting the total annual costs using mid-year discount
factors corresponding to a ten percent discount rate. An
analysis of cumulative costs of each manning option followed.
These cumulative costs were portrayed graphically to indi-
cate that with a sufficiently large discount rate the
relative life cycle costs derived for each manning option
could reverse.
The costs developed in this chapter represent a baseline
cost analysis of both the Navy military and Navy-conversion
to civil service manning options for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. To derive these baseline costs, however, several
assumptions were made which affected the eventual life cycle
cost outcomes for each manning option. The weaknesses
inherent in the baseline costing data sources must also be
recognized in that they cause the life cycle costs of each
manning option to be understated. The life cycle costs
derived in this chapter must therefore be analyzed for
sensitivity to varying cost elements, and discount rates.
This sensitivity analysis, as well as presentation of other
non-quantifiable factors which, due to the degree of softness
of the life cycle costs would affect a manning option deci-
sion to a very significant degree, will be done in Chapter V.
45

V. LIFE CYCLE COST SENSITIVITY AND
NON- QUANTIFIABLE FACTORS
Total life cycle costs for both the Navy military and
civil service manning options for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler were developed in Chapter lY. As was illustrated in
Table IX, the civil service life cycle costs included four
years as a Navy military manned ship, one year as an inactive
ship undergoing overhaul/reconfiguration, and twenty-five
years as a civil service manned ship. A comparison of the
life cycle costs developed for each manning option shows
the civil service manning option to be the least expensive.
All costs derived for this analysis do have a degree of
softness, however, due to some of the necessary assumptions
used in their derivation and the inherent weaknesses of the
baseline costing data sources used in this study. In this
chapter those "soft" cost elements will be identified and
then the effects of changes in these elements upon life cycle
costs will be examined. In addition, life cycle costs will
be examined for sensitivity to changing discount rates.
Sensitivity analysis in the traditional sense is con-
ducted on baseline costs which are considered to be most
representative of actual costs. In this study, however, the
baseline cost analysis was based on data sources with recog-
nized weaknesses, and therefore may not be fully representative
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of present conditions as they apply to the AO-177 class fleet
oiler. Some of the sensitivity analysis in this study will
therefore attempt to reflect changes which have occurred
since the baseline cost data was published. The sensitivity
of the baseline life cycle costs to these particular changes
will be done both individually and simultaneously.
Not only must the life cycle costs be scrutinized for
sensitivity to change in the various cost elements and
discount rates, but also other, non-quantifiable factors must
be examined which would weigh heavily in any manning decision.
These factors are Navy fleet oiler force level requirements
to support carrier battle groups, the expected recruiting
environment during this decade, and the requirement for a
Navy operated AO-177 class fleet oiler to serve as a training
platform for the multi-product AOE/AOR ships.
A. EFFECT OF CHANGING COST ELEMENTS ON LIFE CYCLE COSTS
1. Navy Billet Cost
The civil service personnel cost element of the civil
service manning option is significantly greater than the Navy
billet cost element of the Navy military manning option. This
reflects the higher base wage being paid to the civil service
mariners. Both the MSC civil service wage scale and the Navy
Billet Cost Model reflect FY 81 costing data. The MSC civil
service wage scale reflects the latest pay increase received
by MSC civil service mariners, and for the purposes of life
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cycle costing it was assumed that no further pay increases
would be received by them. The FY 81 Navy Billet Cost
Model, however, does not reflect a large pay increase received
by military personnel in FY 82. In an effort to guage the
effect of the military pay increase on the Navy billet cost
and subsequently total annual and life cycle costs, the
Composite Standard Military Rates for both FY 81 and FY 82
were examined. These rates were found in NAVCOMPTNOTE 7041
dated 18 November 1980, and 2 December 1981 respectively
[Refs. 11, 12]. A comparison of these rates shows an average
increase by a factor of 1.165 from FY 81 to FY 82.
Although it is not known exactly what elements of
the Navy billet cost are affected by the pay increase, it is
estimated that 81.5 percent of the billet cost would be.
This percentage estimate was derived by initially computing
the total composite standard rate for the AO-177 class fleet
oiler by applying the manning levels of each pay grade in
the PSMD to the FY 81 composite rate for that pay grade.
This total composite rate figure when divided by the FY 81
total Navy billet cost yielded a result of .815. For the
purposes of this study, this figure (.815) was applied to
the Navy billet cost to derive the amount which would
increase due to a pay increase. This affected amount was
then increased by a factor of 1.165 and then added to the
remaining unaffected portion of the Navy billet cost to
derive an annual Navy billet cost to include the pay increase.
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This annual Navy billet cost was then discounted over thirty
years to derive the Navy military life cycle costs. The
same method was then applied to derive the increased Mildet
billet cost in the case of the civil service manning option.
The following formulas illustrate this methodology:
CSMR FY 82
^ T ,.r
CSMR l^'Y SI ^'^^^
CSMR FY 81
^ ^.r
MBC FY 81 •^-^^*
Increased NBC = .815 (NBC FY 81) (1.165) + .185 (NBC FY 81),
Where: CSMR = Composite Standard Military Rate, and
NBC = Navy Billet Cost.
To derive the increased life cycle cost of the civil
service option, the effect of the pay increase had to be
applied to the Navy military billet costs for four years,
and then the Mildet billet costs for twenty-five years.
Discounting, as before, was done using ten percent mid-year
factors to derive life cycle costs. The effect of the FY 32
military pay increase on annual personnel, total annual, and
life cycle costs is shown in Table X. It can be seen that
the FY 82 military pay increase significantly increases the






Effect of FY 82 Military Pay Increase
Cost Category
Annual Navy Billet Costs
Total Navy Annual Costs





Annual iMildet Billet Costs
Total Civil Service Annual Costs
Navy Billet Costs (discounted
over four years)
Navy Mildet Costs (discounted
over twenty- five years)
TOTAL NAVY -CONVERSION TO CIVIL










2. Increased Operations Tempo
A significant difference between the Navy billet and
civil service personnel cost structures is that MSC civil
service mariners are paid overtime pay. This overtime pay
cost element is directly related to the operations tempo of
the ship on which they serve. With an increase in operations
tempo the operations cost elements of fuel, repair parts,
stores and supplies and the maintenance cost elements of
RAV, IMA, and overhaul would all increase in the case of
both manning options. These costs would, however, remain
relatively the same as they were for the cost analysis
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conducted in Chapter IV. Therefore no difference in the
life cycle cost relationship of the two manning options
would result from those changes. The same cannot be said of
the overtime pay cost element. It is conceivable that an
increase in operations tempo could ultimately result in an
overtime pay to base pay ratio of one or greater, instead of
the .59 overtime to base pay ratio used in the baseline cost
analysis. As was stated previously in this study, the .59
figure was derived from the CIVMAN and CIV 77 studies which
assumed equal operating profiles for both Navy and MSC-
operated AO-177 class fleet oilers. For the purposes of
this study an increase in operations tempo resulting in an
overtime to base pay ratio of one will be examined. This
will be accomplished by substituting an overtime figure
equal to the base pay figure shown in Table V to derive an
increased Navy civil service personnel cost figure. This
increased civil service personnel cost will then be used to
derive increased total annual and discounted life cycle
costs for the civil service manning option. Table XI shows
the effect of an increased operations tempo on civil service
personnel, total annual, and life cycle costs. It can be
seen that an increased operations tempo significantly
increases the civil service option life cycle costs.
3 . Overhaul Cycle Lengthened to Eight Years
As stated previously, the 1979 Navy Program Factors




Effect of an Increased Operations Tempo
Cost Category Baseline Increased
Civil Service Personnel 4,254,177 4,950,358
Total Annual Cost 9,069,730 9,821,721
TOTAL NAVY -CONVERSION TO
CIVIL SERVICE LIFE CYCLE 117,223,151 121,885,647
class fleet oiler is four years and that the duration of
each overhaul is seven months. Informal conversations with
OPNAV 375 personnel, however, indicate that this time
between overhauls may have been increased to eight years. A
change of this magnitude in overhaul cycle would have a
significant effect on life cycle cost analysis for both the
Navy military and Navy conversion to civil service manning
operations. To determine the effect such a change would have
on the Navy military manning option, some assumptions will
be made. It will be initially assumed that the lengthened
time between overhauls will require the overhaul duration to
also lengthen to one year. For this analysis it will be
hypothesized that the annual RAV and IMA maintenance cost
elements would double to account for the required increased
annual RAV and IMA support necessary in a lengthened over-
haul cycle. To derive the annual overhaul cost associated
with an eight year overhaul cycle, the unit overhaul cost
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figure must first be adjusted. Therefore the unit overhaul
cost v\fill be doubled but then the amount of additional RAV
and IMA maintenance costs incurred as a result of the
lengthened overhaul cycle will be deducted from that doubled
unit overhaul cost figure to derive the adjusted unit over-
haul cost figure for an eight year overhaul cycle. The
additional RAV and IMA costs will be deducted from the unit
overhaul costs because it is reasonable to assume that the
additional annual costs incurred during the overhaul cycle
would ultimately reduce the unit overhaul cost at the end of
the cycle. Then to derive the annual overhaul cost, the
unit overhaul cost is divided by the sum of the length of
time between overhauls and the duration of the overhaul.
Therefore, to derive the adjusted annual overhaul cost, in
this case, the adjusted unit overhaul cost must be divided
by nine. To determine the effect of these changes on the
Navy military life cycle costs, the adjusted annual RAV,
IMA, and overhaul costs will be discounted over thirty years,
An increased overhaul cycle would also affect the
life cycle costs of the Navy military-conversion to civil
service manning option. Conversion would take place after
eight years of Navy military operation instead of after four
years, so all annual Navy military costs will be discounted
over eight years. The Navy military annual RAV, IMA, and
overhaul costs must, as they were in the Navy military
manning option, be adjusted to account for the increased RAV
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and IMA support associated with a lengthened overhaul cycle.
As in the baseline analysis, an overhaul/reconfiguration
time of twelve months will be assumed. During that year
only the reconfiguration costs will be included in the life
cycle costing as the overhaul cost has already been included
by discounting the Navy annual overhaul cost over eight
years. The reconfiguration cost will represent the net
present value of the FY 81 reconfiguration estimate of
twenty two million dollars in FY 89. It will also again be
assumed that the Mildet and civil service crew will be
assigned to the ship after completion of the overhaul/recon-
figuration and that all operations and maintenance costs for
the overhaul/reconfiguration period will be zero. For the
remaining twenty-one years of civil service operation, the
civil service annual operations and maintenance costs and
Mildet personnel costs will be discounted in the same manner
as was done in Chapter IV.
The effect of an eight year overhaul cycle on the
Navy military manning option is shown in Table XII. Only
those cost elements affected are included. Table XII also
shows the effect of an eight year overhaul cycle on the Navy
military-conversion to civil service manning option. All
cost elements had to be included in this portion of the
table as it was assumed that the conversion would coincide





Overhaul Cycle Lengthened to Eight Years
Effect of an 8 Year Overhaul Cycle on Navy Military
Manning Life Cycle Costs
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Effect of an 8 Year Overhaul Cycle on Navy Military
Converted to Civil Service Life Cycle Costs









Navy Billet Cost 3 ,685,572 21,626,936
Logistics Supp ort 1 ,106,000 6,490,008
BOS 106,000 622,008
OPERATIONS
Fuel 1 ,578,000 9,259,704
Utilities 368,000 2,159,424














Civil Service Costs (21 Years)




Mildet Billet Cost 493,930 2,091,166
OPERATIONS
Civil Service Personnel 4,254,177 17,926,362
Fuel 1,578,000 6,680,826
Utilities 368,000 1,558,013
Stores ^ Supplies 281,000 1,189,678
Mildet Logistics Support 139,646 591,223








TOTAL DISCOUNTED CIVIL SERVICE
CYCLE COSTS 49,131,305
TOTAL DISCOUNTED NAVY COSTS 72,351,883
TOTAL NAVY -CIVIL SERVICE LIFE
CYCLE COSTS 121,483,188
Note: The reconfiguration figure represents the Net
Present Value of the FY 81 reconfiguration
estimate of $22 million in FY 89.
It can be seen that the lengthened overhaul cycle
has increased the life cycle costs of both manning options.
The effect is more significant in the civil service manning
option, however, indicating that the relative position of
this manning option is degraded by an eight year overhaul
cycle when compared with the Navy military manning option.
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4. Simultaneous Cost Element Changes
The individual effects of the FY 82 military pay
increase, increased operations tempo, and lengthened over-
haul cycle on life cycle costs have been determined in this
chapter. In view of the FY 82 military pay increase,
increased fleet operating tempos due to Indian Ocean commit-
ments, and altered Navy ship overhaul cycles, however, it is
conceivable that all three changing cost elements could
affect life cycle costs simultaneously. The cumulative
effect that a simultaneous military pay increase, increased
operations tempo, and lengthened overhaul cycle would have
on life cycle costs of each manning option will now be
determined.
The effect that simultaneous cost element changes
would have on the xNavy military option only deals with the
FY 82 military pay increase and lengthened overhaul cycle.
As discussed earlier in this study, an increased operations
tempo does not increase the Navy military manning option
costs relative to the civil service manning option costs.
To derive the life cycle costs associated with increased pay
and a lengthened overhaul cycle for the Navy military
manning option, the annual cost elements of Navy billet
cost, RAV, IMA, and overhaul were increased to reflect the
cost element changes. All of the annual cost elements were
then discounted at a ten percent discount rate over thirty

years to derive the adjusted life cycle costs for the Navy
military manning option.
To derive the life cycle costs for the Navy-conversion
to civil service manning option associated with simultaneous
cost element changes, the Navy military cost elements for
the initial eight years had to be adjusted to reflect the
military pay increase and lengthened overhaul cycle. This
was done in the same manner as described in the previous
paragraph. For the remaining twenty-one years of civil
service operation the cost element of Mildet billet cost
had to be adjusted to reflect the military pay increase.
An increase in operations tempo would result in an increased
civil service personnel cost element and, consequently, in
an increased MSC overhead cost element. All adjusted Navy
military and civil service cost elements were then discounted
over eight and twenty-one years respectively to derive the
adjusted Navy-conversion to civil service life cycle costs.
The Navy military and Navy-conversion to civil service adjusted
life cycle costs associated with a simultaneous increase in
military pay, increased operations tempo, and lengthened
overhaul cycle are shown in Table XIII. It can be seen that
simultaneous cost element changes affect the Navy military-
conversion to civil service manning option to a greater degree




Effect of Simultaneous Cost Element Changes
on Life Cycle Costs
Cost Category Baseline Adjusted
Navy Military Life Cycle Cost 126,312,352 133,000,663
Navy Military-Conversion to
Civil Service Life Cycle Cost 117,223,151 127,855,309
5. Life Cycle Cost Sensitivity to MSC Maintenance Policy
When comparing the total annual cost elements of
each manning option, the maintenance cost element in the
civil service manning total annual cost was found to be
significantly less than that of the Navy military manning
option. As was discussed in Chapter IV, this difference
might be because the Navy maintenance policy is structured
to maintain a ship beyond a thirty year life. If this is
true, then by limiting a Navy military manned ship to no
more than a thirty year life could result in a different
maintenance policy. Assuming that MSC's maintenance policy
meets this criterion, then it is reasonable to question what
the Navy military and Navy military-conversion to civil
service life cycle costs would be if the MSC maintenance
policy were substituted for the Navy maintenance policy.
The resulting life cycle costs from this substitution are




Life Cycle Cost Sensitivity to MSC Maintenance Policy
Life Cycle Cost Category Baseline Adjusted
Navy Military Option 126,312,532 100,598,147
Navy Military-Conversion
to Civil Service Option 117,223,151 108,576,839
It is evident from Table XIV that the substitution
of the MSC maintenance policy for the Navy maintenance
policy results in significantly lower life cycle costs for
both manning options. In addition, and more importantly,
it shows a Navy military life cycle cost considerably less
than the Navy military-conversion to civil service manning
life cycle cost. Assuming that the MSC maintenance policy
is capable of maintaining a fleet oiler over a thirty year
lifetime, and that the Navy would only operate the AO-177
for thirty years, the Navy could realize substantial mainte-
nance life cycle cost savings by adopting a different mainte-
nance policy for the AO-177 class fleet oiler. Note, however,
that a considerable amount of long run readiness may be
sacrificed by this change in maintenance policy. The
examination of whether such a change would be cost-effective
is beyond the scope of this effort.
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6. Life Cycle Cost Sensitivity to Discount Rate
All life cycle costs in this study have been derived
using raid-year discount factors associated with a ten
percent discount rate. As was discussed in Chapter IV,
however, a discount rate does exist at which the life cycle
costs for the Navy military manning option would be less
than those for the Navy-conversion to civil service manning
option. This was made apparent in the graphical display of
cumulative costs shown in Figure 4.4. In an effort to
determine the discount rate at which a relative change in
option life cycle costs would occur, the annual cost elements
derived in Chapter IV were discounted at 20, 15, 12.5, and
12 percent discount rates. The life cycle costs resulting
from these various discount rates are shown in Table XV.
It can be seen that the life cycle cost is very sen-
sitive to discount rate variability, and that at a discount
rate of approximately twelve percent, the life cycle costs
of the Navy military option become less than the Navy
military-conversion to civil service manning option. This
is very significant in that a discount rate of twelve percent
is by no measure unreasonable and is, in fact, very possible.
The life cycle costs adjusted for simultaneous
changes in cost elements associated with a military pay
increase, increased operations tempo, and lengthened overhaul






























rate. In this case it was found that the Navy military life
cycle costs were essentially equal to the Navy military-
conversion to civil service option costs at an eleven percent
discount rate, indicating an even greater sensitivity to
discount rate than the baseline life cycle costs.
The degree of sensitivity of life cycle costs to the
discount rate that has been illustrated is primarily due to
the costs of reconfiguration experienced early in the civil
service manned AO-177 class fleet oiler's life. In that the
initial four (or eight) years of the ship's life are spent
as a Navy military manned ship (and consequently the costs
of both options are equal during this time) , the cost of
reconfiguration weighs heavily against the civil service
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option. At a twelve percent discount rate, or an eleven
percent discount rate in the case of the adjusted cost
elements, the early cost of reconfiguration outweighs the
smaller total annual costs associated with the civil service
manning option during the latter years of the oiler's life.
In any manning option decision, it is essential that this
phenomenon be recognized.
B. NON- QUANTIFIABLE FACTORS
Earlier in this chapter, life cycle costs were examined
for sensitivity to varying cost elements and discount rates.
Not only would life cycle cost sensitivity affect any deci-
sion which would be made concerning a manning option for the
AO-177 class fleet oiler, but also other non-quantifiable
factors would be considered. The non-quantifiable factors
which will be examined in the remainder of this chapter are
Navy fleet oiler force level requirements, the expected
recruiting environment during this decade, and the necessity
for a Navy operated AO-177 class fleet oiler to serve as a
training platform for the multi-product AOE/AOR ships.
These are factors which would be difficult to assign a dollar
value to, but which, nevertheless, would weigh heavily in any
manning option decision.
1. Navy Fleet Oiler Force Level Requirements
The Underway Replenishment Requirements and Forces
Study, (UNREP 84), recommended a minimum oiler force of
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twenty Navy or civil service manned oilers. UNREP 88, the
latest in this series of replenishment studies, forecasts
new scenarios and recommends higher levels commensurate with
the number of carrier battle groups (CVBG) and battleship
surface action groups (BB SAG) to be supported. In 1975,
when the first two AO-177 class fleet oilers were authorized,
the oiler inventory was nineteen. With the exception of
the AO-177 's, the oiler force is quite old, and by the
end of FY 82 will number only seventeen units [Ref. 1].
From these facts it can easily be seen that the oiler force
level is already below recommended inventory levels and is
diminishing. It was partly for this reason that the AO-177
class fleet oiler has been built as a Navy military ship, as
any delay in conversion prior to delivery would have greatly
degraded an already restricted oiler force level. Not only
did this consideration affect the manning option decision
prior to delivery of the AO-177 class fleet oiler, but it
will also affect any future manning option decision that
might be made. As stated previously in this study, it is
estimated that conversion of a Navy military AO-177 class
oiler to civilian manning would take 12-15 months. The
removal of these ships from service in the future for con-
version would adversely affect the ability of the oiler
force to support the battle groups and an expanding Navy.
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2 . Expected Recruiting Environment during this Decade
The Navy, and consequently its need for personnel,
will expand during this decade. During this time of expan-
sion, however, several factors are working against the
ability of the Navy to attract the number of quality recruits
that it will need. These factors must be examined, as any
significant shortage of Navy personnel could require the
increased use of MSC civil service mariners on Navy fleet
support ships.
The domestic trends that v>/ill most significantly
affect the ability of the Navy to attract recruits concern
the youth population. It is expected that the 17-21 year
old male population will decrease by seventeen percent by
the end of this decade. Coincident with this decline is a
higher birth rate among Blacks and Hispanics than among
whites. These factors will affect the Navy in that English
language comprehension among many youth could become a major
problem for an ever more technical Navy [Ref. 15: p. 4].
With a decline in the youth population, greater
competition from both institutions of higher learning and
business to attract quality high school diploma graduates
can be expected. At the same time, although the military in
general is receiving increased appropriations for both hard-
ware and personnel, offsetting savings are being pursued
through recruiting budget cuts. In addition, notwithstanding
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strong opposition from the other services, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) has offered the Army a competitive
recruiting edge with special enlistment incentives for the
Army only [Ref. 13: p. 8].
While the trends discussed above do not directly
affect the manning option decision for the AO-177 class
fleet oiler at this time, they could in the future. As
stated previously, the Navy is expected to expand during
this decade with an attending need for higher numbers of
recruits. Any personnel shortages could lead to a reevalua-
tion of the manning option decision for the AO-177 class
fleet oiler.
3. Training Platform Requirement for AOE/AOR's
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
5 March 1981, a Navy representative was asked what effect the
use of civilian crews on fleet support ships would have on
the Navy's ability to provide logistics support to its fleet
during peacetime and wartime. In response to this question
the Navy representative stated:
"In peacetime when sustainability and the fastest
possible transfer of product is not critical, manning
shuttle ships with civilian crews fully trained in
underway replenishment has essentially only one draw-
back; that is, a reduction in the number of Navy per-
sonnel experienced in underway replenishment. Reducing
this experience base reduces the number of experienced
Navy personnel that can be used to react to expanding
support requirements that could be experienced in wartime.
In wartime Navy manned support ships can provide faster
transfers of product and for longer periods of time.
Sustainability is particularly important in the case of
station ships since they are the units that transfer
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products to most of the combatants. Additionally,
as station ships they must be manned with personnel who
are experts at battle group operations. Only military
personnel meet this criteria." [Re£. 2]
The station ships to which the Navy representative
referred are the AOE/AOR multi-product ships which operate as
integral parts of CVBG's or BB SAG's. Due to the complexity
of the underway replenishment equipment and methods used
by these ships it is imperative that the Navy retains an
adequate number of Navy personnel experienced in underway
replenishment. The AO-177 class fleet oiler represents a
modern, minimally-manned replenishment ship similarly equipped
as the larger AOE/AOR station ships. Subsequently it is very
strongly felt within the Navy that the five AO-177 class fleet
oilers should be military manned to retain an adequate train-
ing platform for the station ships and an acceptable level
of expertise in underway replenishment in the Navy.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, ANT> RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The objective o£ this thesis has been to develop com-
parative life cycle costs associated with the Navy military
and Navy-conversion to civil service manning options for
the AO-177 class fleet oiler. An effectivness model fixed
about the projected operational capabilities of the AO-177
class fleet oiler was used to determine both Navy and civil
service plus Mildet manpower requirements for the ship.
These manpower requirements were presented for both manning
options in Chapter III.
To complete a baseline cost analysis certain conditions
first had to be set. The personnel, operations and mainte-
nance components of total annual costs were all derived
using FY 81 dollars as a base. The total annual costs for
each manning option were then discounted over a thirty year
life using mid-year discount factors corresponding to a ten
percent discount rate to derive comparative life cycle costs
for each manning option of the AO-177 class fleet oiler. A
cumulative cost comparison of the manning options was then
presented graphically.
In that total annual costs drive life cycle costs to a
very great extent, a comparison of total annual costs for
each manning option was conducted. This comparison revealed
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that the primary difference between total annual costs lay
almost exclusively in the maintenance cost element. While
it was not the intent of this study to evaluate either the
Navy or MSC maintenance policies, from just a cursory
comparison the Navy maintenance policy appears to be
considerably different from that of MSC's. In that several
Navy and Navy-converted to MSC ships over thirty years of
age are operating today, this different Navy maintenance
policy may be warranted.
The baseline cost analysis produced thirty year life
cycle costs for each manning option. This baseline analysis
assumed a four year overhaul cycle for the Navy military
manning option, and that any conversion to the civil service
manning option would take place during the first overhaul,
after four years of operation by the Navy. It was also
assumed that reconfiguration would take twelve months. The
result of the baseline cost analysis was that the Navy military
conversion to civil service manning option is somewhat less
costly than the Navy military manning option. This result
could not be considered conclusive, however, due to the
variability of some of the cost elements making up the
total annual cost structure. It therefore became necessary
to examine life cycle cost sensitivity to cost element
variability.
The baseline cost analysis also presented comparative
cumulative costs of each manning option graphically. In
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this illustration o£ cumulative costs the manning option
cumulative cost lines crossed, indicating that with a
sufficiently large discount rate the relative life cycle
costs derived for each manning option would reverse. It
therefore also became necessary to examine the sensitivity
of life cycle costs to discount rate. This life cycle cost
sensitivity to both cost element variability and discount
rate was examined in Chapter V along with presentation of
other non-quantifiable factors which would greatly affect
a manning option decision for the AO-177 class fleet oiler.
As stated previously, the baseline cost analysis neces-
sarily established certain assumptions to serve as a frame-
work within which cost analysis could be conducted. These
initial assumptions also tended to introduce an unknown
degree of bias into the analysis due to limitations in the
costing data available for the study. These potentially
biased cost elements therefore had to be identified and
examined. In Chapter V, life cycle costs were initially
examined for sensitivity to the FY 82 military pay increase,
an eight year overhaul cycle, and an increase in operations
tempo. These particular cost element changes were made so
that the cost elements would reflect changes that have been
observed since FY 81. Manning option life cycle costs were
sensitive to these particular cost element changes, both
when applied individually and simultaneously; however, in
all cases, the Navy conversion to civil service manning
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option remained the least costly of the two manning options
considered.
Life cycle cost sensitivity to the different
use maintenance policy was also examined. While substitu-
tion of the MSC maintenance policy for the Navy maintenance
policy reduced the life cycle costs for both manning options,
the results favored the Navy military manning option to a
much greater degree. In this case the Navy military manning
option life cycle costs were less than those of the other
option. If the MSC maintenance policy were adequate to
maintain a naval ship over a thirty year life, then this
indicates a potential for life cycle cost savings for naval
ships
.
Life cycle cost sensitivity to the discount rate was
also examined in Chapter V. It was discovered that at
approximately a twelve percent discount rate the relative
baseline life cycle costs reverse, and in the case of the
life cycle costs incorporating the three cost element
changes simultaneously, the relative manning option life
cycle costs reverse at approximately an eleven percent
discount rate. This significant degree of life cycle cost
sensitivity to variable discount rates is noteworthy.
While life cycle cost analysis does present a quantifi-
able comparison of the two manning options for the AO-177
class fleet oiler, a manning option decision based on life
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cycle costs alone would ignore other very important non-
quantifiable factors which must also be considered. The
three non-quantifiable factors analyzed in this study were
Navy fleet oiler force level requirements, the expected
recruiting environment during this decade, and the require-
ment of a training platform for the AOE/AOR multi-product
replenishment ships.
The AO-177 class fleet oiler was initially put into
service as a Navy operated ship partly because any delay in
delivery of this class of ship for conversion to civil
service specifications would have degraded an already
restricted oiler force level. The Navy and MSC fleet oiler
force will number seventeen units by the end of FY 82, which
is three units below that recommended in the UNREP 84 study
prior to the envisioned naval expansion. Even higher oiler
force levels were recommended in the UNREP 88 study, commen-
surate with the added replenishment requirements of the
CVBG's and BB SAG ' s . Any future decision to remove the
AO-177 class fleet oiler from service to effect conversion
to civil service specifications will have to weigh the
required Navy fleet oiler force level consideration very
heavily.
The second non-quantifiable factor examined was the
expected recruiting environment during this decade. Various
domestic trends indicate that not only will the overall
17-21 year old male population decrease significantly during
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this decade, but that also English language comprehension
among many youth could become a major problem for the Navy.
These trends combined with an expected greater degree of
competition from business and institutions of higher
learning for high quality high school diploma graduates
could lead to a shortage of personnel in the Navy by the end
of this decade. Any significant personnel shortage could
force a reevaluation of the manning option chosen for the
AO-177 class fleet oiler regardless of cost.
The final non-quantifiable factor discussed in this
study was the requirement for a training platform for the
AOE/AOR multi-product replenishment station ships. Only
military-manned station ships are capable of meeting the
replenishment needs of a CVBG. The AO-177 class fleet
oiler represents a modern, minimally-manned replenishment
ship similarly equipped as the larger station ships. There-
fore it is very strongly felt within the Navy that the AO-17 7
class fleet oiler remain military manned to serve as a




There appears to be no clear economic advantage for the
Navy-conversion to civil service manning option despite the
apparently lesser life cycle costs of this manning option.
Comparative life cycle costs of both manning options remain
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very close even after several individual and simultaneous
cost element changes. In addition, the inherent weaknesses
of the baseline costing data sources introduce a degree of
softness into the life cycle costs derived in Chapter IV.
Also significant is the life cycle cost sensitivity to the
discount rate. Due to the heavy front end cost of recon-
figuration, the later year annual cost savings attributable
to the civil service manning option are overshadowed in the
discounting process. In the baseline cost analysis a ten
percent discount rate was used. If, in actuality, a discount
rate of over twelve percent accurately reflected economic con-
ditions, the Navy military manning option would be the least
costly. This degree of sensitivity to discount rate further
illustrates the effect that the front end costs of Navy
military operation and reconfiguration have on the Navy
military-conversion to civil service manning option for the
AO-177 class fleet oiler. It can therefore also be concluded
that any manning option decision concerning fleet support
ships in general should be made prior to commencement of
construction in order to avoid the front end cost of a
delayed reconfiguration.
Although no conclusions about the adequacy of either the
Navy or MSC maintenance policies can be drawn, it can be
concluded that differences exist between the MSC and Navy




As already stated, the life cycle cost analysis revealed
no clear economic advantage in the case of either manning
option. The non-quantifiable factors, therefore, become the
dominant elements of any manning option decision concerning
the AO-177 class fleet oiler. Given current manning levels
within the Navy, it can be concluded that the factors
favoring a Navy military manned AO-177 class fleet oiler
outweigh those opposing it. The necessity for a Navy manned
AO-177 class fleet oiler to serve as a training platform for
the AOE/AOR multi-product station ships cannot be overempha-
sized in a period of naval expansion and the attendant need
for replenishment support of CVBG's and BB SAG ' s . Given the
UNREP 84 fleet oiler force level requirements, current fleet
oiler force levels indicate the need to avoid the removal
from service of any AO-177 class fleet oilers for conversion
if no clear economic advantage can result therefrom. Those
factors favoring a Navy manned AO-177 class fleet oiler could
be overshadowed later in this decade, however, if the Navy
experiences significant personnel shortages. Conversion of
the AO-177 class fleet oilers might then become a necessity
for the Navy to maintain an adequate operational fleet oiler
force level.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary factors opposing conversion of the AO-177
class fleet oiler to MSC civil service manning are the time
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and cost o£ reconfiguration, and the associated loss to the
Navy of a station ship training platform. Whereas the front
end cost of reconfiguration offsets any later cost savings,
the time required for reconfiguration would place an addi-
tional heavy burden on an already strained fleet oiler force.
The loss of a station ship training platform would result
in a reduction of the number of Navy personnel experienced
in underway replenishment. It is therefore recommended
that the AO-177 class fleet oiler continue to be manned by
Navy military personnel.
Any future fleet oiler manning option decision should be
made in the context of the cost and non-quantifiable factors
discussed. Each factor should be properly weighted according
to the particular circumstances of the time. In the near
future, assuming that the AO-177 class fleet oilers remain Navy
military manned and that the Navy's station ship training plat-
form needs are therefore satisfied, it is recommended that
the next class of fleet oilers be built and operated complete-
ly as MSC civil service manned oilers. This would not only
reduce the strain on the fleet oiler force by introducing
new units into it, but would also require only minimal Mavy
personnel resources in a time of possible recruiting short-
falls. However, it is apparent that the long run force
structure for fleet oilers should be a mix of both Navy
military manned and civil service manned vessels. It is
further recommended that in the case of all future fleet
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oilers, the manning option decision be made prior to the
commencement of construction. This would reduce delays in
delivery, eliminate time-consuming, costly, and wasteful
reconfigurations, and ultimately ease the burden of already
operational fleet oiler assets.
While it was not the intent of this study to evaluate
either the Navy or MSC maintenance policies, it is recom-
mended that a comparative analysis of them be conducted. A
study of current Navy maintenance policy might result in
changes that could produce potentially significant life
cycle cost savings not only for the AO-177 class fleet




NAVY AND MILITARY DETACHMENT BILLET COSTS
The grade and rating breakdown for the Navy military
manning of the AO-177 class fleet oiler are as shown in
Table A-1. The manning levels shown in this breakdown are
in accordance with the PSMD. The billet cost of each grade
or rating was derived from the FY 81 Navy Billet Cost Model.
This billet cost for one year was multiplied by the manning
level of each grade or rating to determine that particular
annual billet cost. These billet costs were then summed to
find the total annual billet cost of manning an AO-177 class
fleet oiler with a Navy military crew. The same method as
described above was used to derive the military detachment
billet cost. The grade and rating breakdown for the mili-





Grade/ Manning 1 Year Total Annual
Rating Level Billet Cost Cost
OFFICERS:
0-5 1 43,953 43,953
0-4 1 37,764 37,764
0-3 3 29,631 88,893
0-2 4 24,217 96,868
0-1 1 24,400 24,400
















QM3 2 15,739 31,478
QMSN 1 14,977 14,977
OPER.\TIONS DEPARTMENT:
OC DIVISION
SMI 1 24,011 24,011
SM2 1 17,562 17,562
SM3 2 15,312 30,624
SMSN 1 14,714 14,714
RMC 1 25,891 25,891
RMl 1 23,078 23,078
RM2 2 18,224 36,448
RM3 1 16,000 16,000
RMSN 2 15,066 30,132
OE DIVISION
ETl 1 23,394 23,394
ET2 2 22,872 45,744


























































BMC 1 24,800 24,800
BMl 1 22 ,788 22.,788
BM2 3 17 ,802 53;,406
BM3 3 14 ,793 44 ,379
BMSN 7 13 ,932 97;,524
**SN 16 13 ,932 222,,912
3rd DIVISION
CMC 3 1 17 ,845 17.,845
**SN 1 19 ,169 19,,169
RASE DIVISION
BMl 1 22 ,788 22 ,788
BM2 1 17 ,802 17. 802
BM3 3 14 ,793 44 ,379
BMSN 3 13 ,932 41,,796
**SN 5 13 ,932 69. 660
EMI 1 22 ,344 22,,344
EM 2 1 19 ,096 19 ,096
EM3 1 19, 202 19,,202
MMC 1 25 ,827 25, 827
MMl 1 22 ,723 22,.723
MM 2 1 19 ,592 19 ,592
MM 3 2 19 ,035 19i,035


















EMC 1 25,521 25,521
EMI 1 22 ,344 22 ,344
EM2 2 19 ,096 38 ,192
EM 3 4 19 ,202 76 ,808
ICl 1 22 ,417 22 ,417
IC2 1 19 ,016 19 ,016
IC3 1 18 ,138 18 .138
ICFN 1 17 ,271 17 ,271
M DIVISION
MMC 1 25 ,827 25 ,827
MMl 2 22:,723 45 ,446
MM2 3 19 ,592 58,,776
MM3 5 19 ,035 95,,175
MMFN 1 18,,283 18 ,283
**FN 6 18,,283 109,,698
R DIVISION
HTC 1 25.,558 25 ,558
HTl 1 22,,642 22 ,642
HT2 2 17 ,644 35',288
HT3 2 15, 503 31 ,006





SHI 22 ,959 22 ,959
SH2 18 ,886 18 ,886
SH3 16 ,178 32 ,356
SHSN 15 ,921 15 ,921
**SN 15,,921 15 ,921
SKC 25,,140 25 ,140
SKI 22 ,891 U L. ,891
SK2 18, 664 18 ,664
SK3 16 ,237 16 ,237
SKSN 15 ,315 15,,815
S-2 DIVISION
MSC 26,,440 26 ,440
MSI 24 ,104 24 ,104
MS 2 2 20 ,688 41 ,376
MS 3 1 15 ,507 15 ,507
MSSN 2 14 ,586 29 ,172





























TOTAL MILDET BILLET COST
Manning 1 Year Total Annual




















**Where non-rated SN or FN appear it is assumed that their
billet cost is that for an E-3 o£ the parent rating.
A billet cost for non-rated SN or FN is not included in
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